Incentives and welfare effect of sharing firm-specific information by Jin, Jim Y.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Jin, Jim Y.
Working Paper
Incentives and welfare effect of sharing
firm-specific information
Discussion papers // WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung,
Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, No. FS IV 97-48
Provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Suggested citation: Jin, Jim Y. (1997) : Incentives and welfare effect of sharing firm-specific
information, Discussion papers // WZB, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung,





FS IV 97 - 48











Jim Y. Jin, Incentives and Welfare Effect of Sharing Firm-Specific
Information, Discussion Paper FS IV 97 - 48, Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin, 1997.
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH,
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Tel. (030) 2 54 91 - 0ABSTRACT
Incentives and Welfare Effect of Sharing Firm-Specific Information
by Jim Y. Jin*
This paper studies the incentives and the welfare effect of sharing firm-specific
information in asymmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly with mixed substitute and
complement goods. Revealing firm-specific cost information is the dominant strategy in
Cournot oligopoly, while concealing is so in Bertrand oligopoly. Such information
sharing always hurts consumers. It increases social welfare in quantity competition and
reduces social welfare in price competition. The results of sharing firm-specific cost
information in Cournot oligopoly also apply to sharing firm-specific demand information
in Cournot and Bertrand competition.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Anreize und Wohlfahrtseffekte beim Austausch unternehmensspezifischer
Information
In diesem Beitrag werden Anreize und Wohlfahrtseffekte des Austauschs von unter-
nehmensspezifischer Information in einem asymmetrischen Cournot- und Bertrand-
Oligopol mit einer Mischung von substitutiven und komplementären Gütern untersucht.
Das Aufdecken unternehmensspezifischer Kosteninformation ist die dominante Strategie
im Cournot-Oligopol, während im Bertrand-Oligopol diese Information vorenthalten
wird. Derartiger Informationsaustausch geht immer zu Lasten der Konsumenten. Er
erhöht die soziale Wohlfahrt im Mengenwettbewerb und verringert die soziale Wohlfahrt
im Preiswettbewerb. Das Ergebnis des Austauschs unternehmensspezifischer Kosten-
information im Cournot-Oligopol läßt sich auch auf den unternehmensspezifischen Aus-
tausch von Nachfrageinformation im Cournot- und Bertrand-Wettbewerb anwenden.
                                           
* I thank Murgie Krishnan, Bill Novshek, Lynda Thoman and Michael Tröge for their comments
and suggestions. The responsibility for remaining errors is mine.1. Introduction
Information sharing is a common practice in business. On one hand it improves the
market efficiency by providing firms more accurate information. On the other hand, it
may raise the chance of collusion among competitors. Thus the incentives and the
welfare impact of information sharing have drawn considerably attention from economic
research. The existing models can be divided into two groups according to the type of
uncertainty they deal with: a common (demand) shock affecting all firms equally and
private (cost) shocks affecting each individual firm differently. This paper examines the
latter case, while extending the earlier models to asymmetric oligopoly with mixed
substitute and complement products.
The first task of this paper is to find a general conclusion regarding firms' incentives to
share firm-specific information. The information sharing literature started by studying
firms' incentives to share information about a common demand shock. Novshek and
Sonnenschein (1982) showed that such incentives do not exist in Cournot duopoly with
homogeneous goods. The result was extended by Clarke (1983) to oligopoly. Further,
Vives (1984) found that firms have incentives to share information in Cournot
competition with complementary goods and in Bertrand competition with substitute
goods. When private cost uncertainty is concerned, however, a very different picture
emerges. Sakai (1985) considered various information structures about costs in Cournot
duopoly and found that a firm is better off when its cost is known to its rival. In Cournot
oligopoly, Li (1985) proved that revealing private uncertainty is the dominant strategy,
and pointed out that the different result from the case of common demand uncertainty is
due to "private values" vs. "common values", rather than cost vs. demand. The
conclusion changed again as Gal-Or (1986) proved that concealing private costs is the
dominant strategy for Bertrand duopolists, opposite to the Cournot case. Recently, Raith
(1996) used a general Cournot oligopoly model to show that firms always have
incentives to reveal private costs. He argued that the results "are not due to cost
uncertainty or 'private values' but are determined by the mere assumption of perfect
signals" (p. 276). In Bertrand oligopoly Raith found that Gal-Or's result may not hold,
hence "in general there do not even exist dominant revelation strategies" (p. 279).2
Extending Raith's symmetric model to asymmetric oligopoly with mixed complement and
substitute products, we gain further insight which cannot be obtained in symmetric
models. First, the example in the next section shows that mere assumption of perfect
signal does not guarantee an incentive to reveal a private cost in asymmetric Cournot
oligopoly. Such an incentive can be ensured if only firm-specific information is revealed,
which means that the information only reveals the specific feature of the firm, but not
anything about others. The same occlusion holds for sharing firm-specific demand
information in both Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly. Secondly, Gal-Or's result can be
generalized to asymmetric Bertrand oligopoly, i.e., no firm has an incentive to reveal
firm-specific cost information. The strong results depends on neither "private values" nor
"perfect signal", but are merely due to firm-specific information.
The definition of firm-specific information, i.e., not relevant to any other firms, also
enables us to draw strong conclusions on welfare effects of sharing such information.
The literature has so far only considered the problem assuming symmetry in demand,
cost and information. Shapiro (1986) showed that exchange of cost information in
Cournot oligopoly increases social welfare, but reduces consumer surplus. In Bertrand
duopoly Sakai and Yamato (1990) found that both social welfare and consumer surplus
fall if firms share cost information. It would be nice to generalize these results under
more general conditions. Unfortunately, in symmetric Cournot oligopoly with
differentiated products, Sakai and Yamato (1989) found an ambiguous impact of
exchanging cost information on consumers. Also, the same ambiguity exists in Bertrand
oligopoly with more than eight firms (Kühn and Vives [1995]). In these and other
previous models, however, information shared among firms is not firm-specific1. With
firm-specific information, the ambiguity disappears even if in a general asymmetric
oligopoly. We will show that exchanging firm-specific cost information hurts consumers
in both Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly. It increases social welfare in quantity
competition and reduces social welfare in price competition. The conclusions for sharing
cost information in quantity competition also apply to sharing firm-specific demand
information in both Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly.
                                           
1 In their models costs are correlated in such a way that revealing firm i's cost helps other firms to
have better estimation on firm j's cost.3
This paper is organized as follows: the next section introduces the model; Section 3
examines firms' incentives to reveal firm-specific information; the welfare effect is
analyzed in Section 4, followed by the closing remarks in the last section.
2. Asymmetric oligopoly with firm-specific information
We consider an oligopoly market with n differentiated products and a competitive
market with a numeraire good x0 whose price is normalized to 1. Denote firm i's output
by xi for i = 1, . . n, and the n·1 output vector by x. Firm i's price is pi and the price
vector is p. The representative consumer has a fixed wealth w and quadratic utility
function x0 + a￿x - 0.5x'Bx, where a is an n·1 vector and B is a symmetric n·n matrix.
The elements of B are denoted by bij. The utility function is strictly concave, so B is
positive definite, its inverse B-1 exists and is also positive definite. Denote its elements by
bij. Given the price vector p the representative consumer chooses x0 and x to maximize
her utility given her budget constraint x0 + p￿x £ w. Assume that her income is
sufficiently large that an interior solution always exists. Since B is positive definite, the
first-order conditions 1 - l = 0 and a - Bx - lp = 0 give us the inverse demand function
in quantity competition:
p = a - Bx (1)
Let a a ” B-1a. We have the demand function in price competition as
x = a a - B-1p (2)
When we consider firm-specific information, it can be about firms' private demand or
cost uncertainty. As shown by aforementioned previous works, demand and cost
uncertainties in Cournot competition are equivalent. Demand uncertainty in Bertrand
competition has the same mathematical structure as in a Cournot case, with B and a
replaced by B-1 and a a. These differences do not affect our results. Therefore we need
only consider the cases of Cournot and Bertrand competition with private cost
uncertainty. The conclusions from the former case automatically apply to demand
uncertainty in Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly.4
Assume that any firm i's marginal cost ci is a random variable with mean c￿ i. The n firms'
cost vector and its mean are c and c￿. There may be some public information about c.
The estimation of c based on public information is denoted by c -. This implies E[(ci-c -
i)c -
i]
= 0 for all i. Firm i's estimation of its own cost is denoted by c ^
i and the corresponding
vector is c ^. If firm i reveals its information, its private information becomes public, so c -
i
and c ^
i are identical2. Otherwise they are different. We say that firm i's private information
is firm-specific when E[(c ^
i-c -
i)c -




j)] = 0 for all j „ i. When firm i
reveals its private information, it does not affect estimations,  public or private, regarding
any other firm's cost.
For example, we can let ci = c￿ i + e + ei. e represent a common uncertainty, such as GDP
and the oil price and ei is private. Public information about e such as government
policies, media reports leads to a common estimation of e. Although this estimation is
useful to predict ci, another firm j's private information may be totally irrelevant to e and
ei. Then, ci and cj can be correlated, while private information is firm-specific.
We write firm i's profit functions pi(x) in quantity and pi(p) in price competition as:








Firms play a two-stage game. In the first stage, they decide whether to reveal firm-
specific information about their marginal costs. In the second stage, costs are realized
and revealed according to the first stage decisions. Then firms choose quantities or prices
to maximize their expected profits (3) or (4). Assume that for any possible cost
estimations, firms always get interior solutions for their equilibrium quantities or prices.
Our model is an extension of Raith's (1996). Setting bii = b and bij = r for all i and j „ i,
we get his symmetric Cournot oligopoly model. This asymmetric model allows us to
better understand why the previous conclusions hold and investigate whether they can be
generalized. The model also allows correlated costs and firms to have imperfect signals
about their own costs. Actually, as special cases we can obtain Raith's "private values" by
                                           
2 We can also allow firms to partially reveal their firm-specific information. In that case conclusions
obtained in this paper still hold.5
adding a condition E[(ci-c￿ i)(cj-c￿ j)] = 0 for all j „ i. We can also have his "perfect signals"
by requiring c ^ ” c. The generality is necessary first because our research also covers the
case of demand uncertainty where demand is often correlated and signals are normally
imperfect. More importantly, one can see that the general results can be obtained without
either "private values" or "perfect signals", but mainly due to firm-specific information.
The following is an example of our asymmetric oligopoly. It shows that, different from
Raith' conclusion in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, a firm may not want to reveal its
uncertainty even though it has perfect signal. Assume that there are three firms with zero
cost and asymmetric demand functions:
p1 = 1 - x1 - x2 + e,   p2 = 2 - x1 - 2x2 - x3 + e,  p3 = 1 - x2 - x3
where e has a zero mean and a variance s², and is known by firms 1 and 2. The
equilibrium outputs are x1 = 1/3 + 3e/7, x2 = 1/3 + e/7 and x3 = 1/3. Firm 1's expected
profit is 1/9 + s²(3/7)². If firm 1 reveals e to firm 3, the strategies become x1 = 1/3 +
5e/12, x2 = 1/3 + e/6 and x3 = 1/3 - e/12. Then, firm 1's profit falls to 1/9 + s²(5/12)².
This example shows that perfect signals are not sufficient for firms' willingness to reveal
their uncertainties. The current paper will show that it is also not necessary. Rather, it is
firm-specific information that guarantees the incentive even if we allow mixed products
in Cournot oligopoly.
Another unsolved problem is whether one can generalize Gal-Or's result of no incentive
for cost revelation from Bertrand duopoly to oligopoly. Raith argued that this is
impossible even in his symmetric case where every firm i faces a demand function xi = a -
bpi - g￿j„ipj. He derived the following condition for information concealing: 4(2b-g) + (n-
1)g(4b-3g) > 0. Actually, the first term should be multiplied by b. Then, if one uses his
assumption on page 266, -b/(n-1) < g < b, the inequality is guaranteed. Thus, Gal-Or's
result probably can be extended. We will show that this is indeed the case if firms share
firm-specific information.6
3. Dominant revelation strategy
To simplify the mathematical expression, we introduce some notations. Let D and L be
diagonal matrices whose every ith diagonal element is identical to that in B and B
-1
respectively. Let x* and p* be the equilibrium output and price vectors when all costs are
known and equal to zero. Now we can give our first result.
Proposition 1: Given firm-specific cost uncertainty, the unique equilibrium strategies in
Cournot and Bertrand competition are given as follows
x = x* - (D+B)
-1c - - 0.5D
-1(c ^-c -)   (5)
p = p* + (L+B
-1)
-1Lc - + 0.5(c ^-c -)   (6)
Proof: see Appendix A.
Given (5) and (6), we can evaluate the change in firm i's expected profit when it reveals
its firm-specific cost information. Firm i's revelation makes other firms' estimation of firm
i's cost, c -
i, equal to firm i's own estimation c ^
i. Since the information is firm-specific,




i) in Cournot competition. Similarly,  given (6), if firm i reveals




i) in Bertrand competition. In Cournot
competition, firm i's first-order condition requires that biixi = Ei(pi-ci). Thus, its expected
profit E[xi(pi-ci)] = biiE(x² i). Likewise, in Bertrand competition, firm i's expected profit
can be written as biiE[(pi-ci)²]. Therefore, a Cournot firm wants to reveal its private cost
if its expected squared output rises, and a Bertrand firm will do so if its expected squared
mark-up rises. Then, we can find a general conclusion regarding firms' incentives to
reveal firm-specific information.
Proposition 2: Sharing firm-specific cost information is the dominant strategy for
Cournot firms, but concealing information is so for Bertrand firms.
Proof: see Appendix B.
The intuitive explanation is given as follows. When a firm reveals its firm-specific
information, e.g. a low cost, other firms' payoffs do not change directly and they respond7
to the revelation only because they anticipate a change in revealing firm's action, e.g. a
higher output in Cournot competition. Consequently, the production of substitute goods
decreases and that of complement goods rises. In return, these responses induce the
revealing firm further raise its output than it would do without cost revelation. Similarly,
other firms' responses make its output decreases more when it reveals a high cost. Thus,
its expected squared output becomes larger, which means a higher expected profit in
Cournot competition. In Bertrand competition, revealing a high cost signals a higher
price. The substitute producers respond by raising prices and the complement produces
by lowering prices. Therefore, the revealing firm's price varies more due to cost
revelation. However, a Bertrand firm's profit depends on the expected squared mark-up.
A higher price variation means a lower variation of mark-up and a lower expected profit.
This is why we have opposite incentives for revealing firm-specific cost information in
quantity and price competition. The result in Cournot competition applies to revealing
firm-specific demand information in Bertrand competition because a higher price
variation implies a higher variation of mark-up given a constant marginal cost.
4. Welfare effect
In this section we evaluate the impact of revealing firm-specific information on the
expected consumer surplus and social welfare. In Cournot competition, using the
demand function (1) we can write consumer surplus and social welfare as
CS(x) = 0.5x'Bx
SW(x) =  (a-c)￿x - 0.5x'Bx
When any firm reveals its firm-specific cost information, we can show that E(x'Bx)
decreases and E[(a-c)x] increases. This is independent of whether other firms reveal their
firm-specific information. Hence the welfare effect of sharing firm-specific information is
unambiguous.
Proposition 3: In Cournot competition sharing firm-specific cost information reduces
consumer surplus but increases social welfare.
Proof: see Appendix C.8
The result applies to sharing firm-specific demand information in Cournot oligopoly. In
Bertrand oligopoly, given the demand function (2) we write consumer surplus and social
welfare as functions of prices,
CS(p) = 0.5a a'Ba a - a a￿p + 0.5p'B-1p
SW(p) = 0.5a a'Ba a - a a￿c + c'B-1p - 0.5p'B-1p
The expected values of the first term in consumer surplus and the first three terms in
social welfare are not affected by information sharing. The other two terms in consumer
surplus have the same mathematical form as the social welfare function in Cournot
competition with p replacing x and an opposite sign. The last term in social welfare has
the same functional form as the consumer surplus function in Cournot competition, with
p replacing x and an opposite sign.
One can find the identically corresponding terms in the Bertrand equilibrium strategy (6)
to (5), with p for x, B-1 for B, L for D and Lc for c. Given the similarity of equilibrium
strategies and welfare functions in price and quantity competition, an opposite effect on
consumer surplus in quantity competition can be applied to social welfare in price
competition, and an opposite social welfare effect in quantity competition is applicable to
consumer surplus in price competition. Therefore, we conclude that sharing firm-specific
demand information in price competition must lower consumer surplus and raise social
welfare.
When firms share cost information in Bertrand oligopoly, the expected values of the first
two terms in consumer surplus and social welfare, namely 0.5a a'Ba a - a a￿p and 0.5a a'Ba a -
a a￿c, are not affected. Hence, consumer surplus must fall. We can show that the expected
value of c'B-1p - 0.5p'B-1p in social welfare also falls.
Proposition 4: In price competition both consumers and society are worse off when
firms share firm-specific cost information.
Proof: see Appendix D.
The findings bear some policy implications regarding exchange of firm-specific
information. When firms exchange firm-specific demand information or exchange cost
information in quantity competition, their incentives are justified by non-collusive9
behavior and the social welfare increases provided firms do not collude. Hence restricting
such information exchange may not be necessary when there is not evidence of collusion.
In contrast, when firms exchange firm-specific cost information in price competition,
their incentives can not be justified by non-collusive behavior and the social welfare
decreases even if firms do not collude. Then an anti-trust authority should pay close
attention to such information sharing activities. If the policy goal is merely to benefit
consumers, sharing any firm-specific information should be closely monitored in both
Cournot and Bertrand industries.
5. Closing Remarks
This paper examines firms' incentive to exchange firm-specific information and the
welfare effect in asymmetric oligopoly with any mixture of substitute and complement
goods. We found that revealing demand information is the dominant strategy in both
Cournot and Bertrand competition. Revealing cost is dominant in Cournot competition,
but concealing cost is so in Bertrand competition. While exchange of firm-specific
demand or cost information always hurts consumers, sharing firm-specific demand
information is socially desirable. Exchange of firm-specific cost information is socially
desirable in quantity competition, but undesirable in price competition.
The assumption of firm-specific information plays an essential role in obtaining robust
results. Since our model allows "independent values" and "perfect signals" as special
cases, it proposes firm-specific information as an alternative explanation for the incentive
problem. A possible extension is to consider other economic games with firm-specific
information. For instance, companies may reveal firm-specific features, such as the
product quality, before R&D or advertisement decisions. It is not known yet whether
there always exists a dominant revelation strategy, and if so, how it is determined. These
questions may deserve future research.10
APPENDIX
Appendix A: (i) Prove that (5) is the unique equilibrium strategy. Let (D+B)i be the ith
row of D + B. The first order condition for firm i's quantity is
ai - c ^
i = Ei[(D+B)ix] (A)
Substituting (5) into (A) and using Ei(c ^
j-c -
j) = 0 for j „ i, we have
Ei[(D+B)ix] =  (D+B)ix* - c -
i - (c ^
i-c -
i)
(A) becomes ai = (D+B)ix*. It holds given the definition of x*. So (5) is an equilibrium.
Suppose there is another equilibrium strategy x + y where x is given by (5). The first-
order condition (A) implies (D+B)iEi(y) = 0 for every i. Let y-i be the sub-vector of y
without yi. Another firm j has all the information about y-i that firm i has. So firm j knows
Ei(y-i) and can infer yi from (D+B)iEi(y) = 0. Hence, all firms know y and we must have
(D+B)y = 0, which implies y = 0.
(ii) The proof of (6) easily follows the same procedure and will not be repeated.  ||
Appendix B: (i) Prove E(x² i) increases when c ^
i replaces c -
i. We need to show that
E[Dxi(2xi+Dxi)] > 0 (B1)
where Dxi is the change in xi due to revelation of c ^. As xi = x* i - (D+B)-1






i), and E[(c ^
i-c -
i)c -] = 0, (B1) holds if (D+B)-1
ii² - 1/(2bii)² > 0, or
2bii[(D+B)-1
ii] > 1 (B2)
Let Fi be the sub-matrix of D + B without its ith row and column, fi be the sub-vector of
(D+B)i without 2bii, and fi be the sub-vector of (D+B)-1
i without (D+B)-1
ii. Then we have
2bii(D+B)-1
ii + fi￿fi = 1  (B3)
(D+B)-1
iifi + Fifi = 0 (B4)
Pre-multiply (B4) by fi, we get (D+B)-1
iifi￿fi + fiFifi = 0. fiFifi > 0 because Fi is positive
definite. So fi￿fi < 0. (B3) implies 2bii(D+B)-1
ii = 1 - fi￿fi > 1, (B2) holds.11
(ii) Prove E[(pi+Dpi-ci)²]) < E[(pi-ci)²]), where Dpi is due to revelation of c ^
i, i.e.,
E[Dpi(2pi-2ci+Dpi)] < 0 (B5)
As pi = p* i + (L+B
-1)-1
iLc - + 0.5(c ^
i-c -






i)c -] = 0 and
E[ci(c ^
i-c -
i)] = E[(c ^
i-c -





iibii-1.5} < 0 (B6)
(B6) holds if 0.5 < (L+B
-1)-1
iibii < 1. 1 - (L+B
-1)-1











iibii > 0.5 is implied by (B2) given the similarity of B and B
-1.  ||
Appendix C: (i) Prove E(x'Bx) falls if c -
i becomes c ^
i. Using (5), E[(c ^
j-c -





k)] = 0 for all k „ j, we get




where k1 is constant. If c -
i changes to c ^
i, the last term of (C1) loses 0.25E[(c ^
i-c -
i)²]/bii, the
second term gains by {(D+B)-1B(D+B)-1}iiE[(c ^
i-c -




 < 0 (C2)












(ii) Prove E[(a-c)￿x] rises as c -
i becomes c ^
i. As E(cc -
j) = E(c -c -
j), E[(cj(c ^
j-c -
j)] = E[(c ^
j-c -
j)²]
for all j, and E[(ck(c ^
j-c -
j)] = 0 for all k „ j, we have






k2 is fixed. As c -
i changes to c ^






i)²]. Given (B) the change is positive as bii(D+B)-1
ii > 0.5.       ||12
Appendix D: Prove that E(cB-1p-0.5pB-1p) falls when c -
i changes to c ^
i. Given (6), E(cc -
j)
= E(c -c -
j), E[(cj(c ^
j-c -
j)] = E[(c ^
j-c -
j)²] for all j, and E[(ck(c ^
j-c -
j)] = 0 for all k „ j, we get
E(cB-1p-0.5pB-1p) = k3 + E[c -B
-1(L+B












i is revealed, the change in (D1) is {B
-1(L+B
-1)-1L}ii - 0.5b² ii(B-1+L)-1
iB-1(B-1+L)-1
i -





-1)-1L = L - L(L+B
-1)-1L, we get {B
-1(L+B
-1)-1L}ii = bii -  b² ii[bii(L+B
-1)-1
ii.




ii - 1.25 + bii(B-1+L)-1
iB-1(B-1+L)-1
i > 0 (D2)
If 2bii(B
-1+L)-1
ii > 1.25, (D2) holds. Otherwise, write B-1 as A + C, with its ith column











Hence (D2) always holds given 1 < 2bii(B
-1+L)-1
ii < 1.25. E(cB-1p-0.5pB-1p) falls.  ||13
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